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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
A somewhat similar treatment might be made in the case of insur-
ance installments. Rather than tax the sum total of the premiums paid
to the insurer at three per cent, a.tax might be levied on the cash value
of the policy at the time of the death of the insured, exempting all in-
come above three per cent taxable income until the excluded non-taxable
income reaches the 'face value of the policy. This plan in no way
would tax the corpus of the policy, but would be a tax on the income
only.
It is evident that Congress is leaving untouched an abundant source
of taxable income. In this era when every available source should be
tapped, it is suggested that Section 22(b) (1) be amended so as to
include sums paid above the value of the policy at the time of the death.
CECIL J. HILL.
Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Application to Unexplained
Airplane Accidents
In a recent North Carolina case of first impression the Supreme
Court refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to an unex-
plained airplane accident. The facts of the case were that a passenger
invited by the pilot for a ride was injured when the plane crashed with-
out any apparent reason. Both the plaintiff and the pilot testified that
the plane went into a spin and crashed, and that neither had any knowl-
edge of the reason why. The Court said that "The 'doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur does not apply because any number of causes may have been
responsible for the plane falling, including causes over which the pilot
had absolutely no control, it being common knowledge that aeroplanes
do fall without the fault of the pilot."'
Translated literally, res ipsa toquitur means "the thing speaks for
itself." The doctrine had its origin in 1863 in an English case where
a barrel of flour fell from a second story window and injured the plain-
tiff.2  It involves the use of circumstantial evidence to establish the
plaintiff's case by allowing an inference or presumption of negligence
to arise from the circumstances of the accident itself. An accident re-
sulting in injury must be accompanied by surrounding circumstances
which, viewed in the light of the entire situation, give rise to an infer-
ence of negligence. From the layman's point of view it can be stated
as follows: "What is required is evidence from which reasonable men
may conclude that, upon the whole, it is more likely that there was
negligence than there was not." 3
The deirelopment of the doctrine has led to much confusion in
1 Smith v. Whitley, 223 N. C. 534, 535, 27 S. E. (2d) 442, 443 (1943).
2 Bryne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).
' PROSSER, TORTS (1941) §43.
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various courts as to the types of accidents to which the doctrine applies
and as to the procedural effect of its application.4* In this note there
will be no further discussion of the procedural effects of res ipsa loqui-
tur, except to point out that North Carolina follows 'the "inference"
rule, by which the jury is free to find negligence or not.5
I. DoEs REs IPSA LOQUITUR APPLY TO UNEXPLAINED
AIRPLANE ACCIDENTS?
A. Some courts refuse to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to
airplane accidents more or less arbitrarily. Such lecisions seem to
rest on the theory that the inference that there had been negligence on
the part of the defendant must be stronger than the inference that there
was not. Nothing else appearing, the scales being evenly balanced be-
tween negligence and non-negligence, the courts say that the airplane
has not reached such a stage of development as to make the inference of
negligence the stronger one.
The North Carolina Court seems to have relied solely on the New
York case of Rochester Gas and Electric Corp. v. Dunlop. In this case
the plane crashed at night into the plaintiff's tower carrying transmis-
sion lines, doing considerable property damage. The Court said: "It is
common knowledge that airplanes fall in a great many instances from
causes over which the pilot has absolutely no control. Time and again
we read in the newspapers where a complete inspection of the plane is
made before starting and that for some unknown reason the engine stops,
requiring a forced landing which often results in a crash." 6* In this case,
'* HARPER, TORTS (1938) §77. "The effect of the doctrine, once it is applicable,
is not quite clear from the cases, some courts holding to one, some another and
still others to all three of the possible results. The least effect of the presumption
that is said to arise from the rule of res ipsa loquitur is to furnish 'some' evi-
dence of negligence, sufficient to insure the plaintiff of getting his case to the
jury if the defendant offers no rebutting evidence. . . . Again, the presumption
is sometimes held to require the defendant to come forward with some explanation
or some rebutting evidenc . If he does so, there ig a jury case, but if he fails
to satisfy this burden, the defendant cannot get to the jury on the issue of negli-
gence and is subject to a-verdict directed against him. . . . Still other juris-
dictions hold that when the plaintiff makes out a res ipsa loquitur case, the
burden of proof, in the strict sense, is on the defendant and the risk of obtaining
an affirmative finding by the jury on the issue of negligence is upon him. The
plaintiff is entitled to the verdict unless the defendant satisfies the jury by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was not guilty of negligence."
'Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N. C. 178, 13 S. E. (2d) 242 (1941), 19 N. C.
L. REv. 671; White v. Hines, 182 N. C. 275, 109 S. E. 31 (1921); Womble v.
Merchants Grocery Co., 135 N. C. 474, 47 S. E. 493 (1904).
o, 266 N. Y. Supp. 469, 472 (1933). In Conklin v. Canadian Colonial Airways,
242 App. Div. 625, 271 N. Y. Supp. 1107, 1934 U. S. Av. R. 21 (1934), aff'd, 266
N. Y. 244, 194 N. E. 692 (1935) there were similar facts in that a passenger
plane crashed into high tension wires and burned. Controversy arose over
whether the plane should have attempted the trip under the weather conditions
and the defendant claimed that an unavoidable accident had occurred. The Court
said that the mere fact that an accident occurred did not make the defendant
liable, but the plaintiff was awarded a verdict on negligence.
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it is to be noted that although the Cotirt refused to apply res ipsa
loquitur, the plaintiff recovered on the theory of trespass. Tennessee
has a case of a plane crashing on a sightseeing trip which said: "This is
not a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur, for it is a common and
not unusual occurrence for airplanes to stall and fall while in operation,
and without the intervention of any act upon the part of the operator.
Under such circumstances it was the duty of the plaintiff to point out
the negligence upon which they attributed the proximate cause of the
injury.' 7 In the Arkansas case of Herndon v. Gregory, the Court cited
cases in which the doctrine of res ipsa loqitur had been applied to air-
plane accidents, but refused to follow them, saying: "While it has been
judicially recognized that aviation is no longer an experiment, it still is
in its formative stage, and liability of the carrier should hardly be meas-
ured by the same rule of law governing transportation by land or water.
... It would appear that one taking flight in an airplane assumes certain
apparent risks in this mode of travel which are of greater hazard than
travel on land or water. . . This accident may have been caused by
one or more of a number of reasons over which the owner and operator
of the airplane had no control." 8
A Wyominge* and a Georgia case10 seem in accord with the previous
cases in saying that the time had not yet arrived for the application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to airplane accidents. In an Ontario
case, where the pilot was killed in a crash caused by a welding defect,
the Court found no evidence of the defendant manufacturer's negligence
and refused to apply res ipsa loquitur.11
B. In contrast to those courts which have held the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur inapplicable to unexplained airplane accidents, other courts
have held that the doctrine is applicable.
New York, in a case previous to the Dunlop Case, where a passenger
plane crashed on a clear day after making a turn, held: "The charge
was likewise prejudicial in its failure to charge the doctrine of res
'Boulineaux v. City of Knoxville, 20 Tenn. App. 404, 410, 99 S. W. (2d)
557, 560, 1937 U. S. Av. R. 145, 151 (1935).8190 Ark. 702, 709, 81 S. W. (2d) 849, 852, 1935 U. S. Av. R. 44, 45 (1935).
'*Cohn v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 17 F. Supp. 865, 869 (D. C.
Wyo. 1937). A plane crashed on its test flight. The Court, in holding for the
defendant, said: "It may be that in the not too distant future in the evolution and
development of the wonderful and enchanting science of aviation, a sufficient fund
of information and knowledge may be afforded to make a safe basis in com-
pensating for, the injuries sustained, the doctrine here invoked; but it seems to
me quite clear that the time has not yet arrived .... It will not do to discourage
the pioneer by making him assume undue hazards in a monetary way. In the
meantime it is quite evident that those who choose air-ways for transportation
must in many instances be held to have themselves assumed the risk."
o Morrison v. Le Tourneau, 138 F. (2d) 339 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943).




ipsa loquitur, which had, under the facts appearing in this record, appli-
cation to this case as a rule of evidence to aid the jury in passing upon
the issue of liability."'12 In another New York case, which was decided
subsequent to the Dunlop Case, an experienced pilot rented a plane and
kept it aloft longer than he had been told the gas supply would permit
and as a consequence of this, and the failure to use the reserve tank,
the plane ran out of gas and crashed. Here the Court stated: "Although
the burden of proof of negligence in such cases unquestionably rests upon
the plaintiff, yet he is not always required to point out the precise act
or omission in which the negligence consists. . . Negligence may be
inferred from the circumstances of the case. Where the accident, as in
the case at bar, is one which in the ordinary course of events would not
have happened but for the want of proper care on the part of the defend-
ant, it is incumbent upon him to show that he had taken such pre-
caution as prudence would ictate, and his failure to furnish the proof,
where if it existed, it would be within his power, may subject him to
the inference that such precautions were omitted."'1 3 Two California
cases, Smith v. O'Donnell'4 and Thomas v. American Airways' 5 have
held the doctrine applicable to airplane accidents. In line with these
decisions are an Alaskan case" and a- Washington case.' 7 The Wash-
ington case is unusual in that the defendant's plane, while on the ground,
ran across a field with no one at the controls and damaged the plain-
tiff's hangar and plane.
In another Ontario case, where a passenger plane crashed while the
pilot attempted to gain control after pulling out from a dive, the Court
said: "Travel by aeroplane must now be regarded as a common means
of transport, extensively used, not only throughout North America, but
in many other parts of the world. With experienced and careful pilots
and proper equipment, a passenger has the right to expect that he will
be carried safely to his destination.""' The Manitoba Court followed
Ontario in holding the doctrine applicable in Mclnmerny v. McDoug-
all,1 and in Nysted v. Wings Ltd.20 These Canadian cases seem to be
- Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc., 247 N. Y. Supp. 251, 253 (1930).
" Braman-Johnson Service, Inc. v. Thompson, 3 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 602, 607,
1939 U. S. Av. R. 142, 147 (1938) ; accord, Stoll v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.,
236 App. Div. 664, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 148 (1930), off'd, 257 N. Y. Supp. 1010,
1932 U. S. Av. R. 163 (1932).
a, 215 Cal. 714, 5 P. (2d) 690 (1931), aff'd and opinion adopted, 12 P. (2d)
933 (1932).
15 1935 U. S. Av. R. 102.
a Smith v: Pacific Alaska Airways, 89 F. (2d) 253 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
'Genero v. Ewing, 176 Wash. 78, 28 P. (2d) 116, 1934 U. S. Av. R. 11
(1934).
"8 Malone v. Trans-Canada Airlines & Moss v. Same, 3 D. L. R. 369, 371
(Ct. of App., Ontario, 1942).
1' 3 Western Weekly Rep. 625, 1938 U. S. Av. RL 166 (K. B., Manitoba,
1938).
20 3 D. L. R. 336 (K. B., Manitoba, 1942).
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in line with the British case of Fosbroke-Hobbes v. Airwork Ltd., in
which a plane crashed just after the take-off. Here the Court said:
"That this disastrous accident was due to the fault of the pilot, is in
my opinion, abundantly dear. In the first place I hold that the doctrine
of res ipsa2 loquitur applies. . . . It was argued that I ought not to
apply this doctrine to an aeroplane, a comparatively new means of loco-
motion, and one necessarily exposed to the many risks which must be
encountered in flying through the air, but I cannot see that this is any
reason for excluding it. Large numbers of aeroplanes are daily engaged
in carrying mails and passengers all over the world, and as is well
known, they arrive and depart with the regularity of express trains.
They have indeed become a common-place method of travel, supple-
menting, though not superceding, rail and sea transport." 2'
C. Some courts have held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
applicable but only in a proper case, that is to say when all prereq-
uisites are present. Only two of these prerequisites have caused diffi-
.culties in the airplane cases and call for any further comment.
(1) Control of the instrumentality. ". . . when certain types of
harms occur under circumstances, which from common experience,
strongly suggest negligence and when the agency or instrumentality
which occasioned the harm is under the exclusive control and manage-
ment of the defendant, so that he is in a better position to prove his
innocence than the plaintiff is to prove his negligence, there exists a
res ipsa loquitur case."
'22
In the California case of Parker v. Granger,23* the South Dakota
case of Budgett v. Soo Sky WaysA* and the Tennessee case of Towle
v. Phillips,2 5 the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was held inapplicable be-
cause the planes were equipped with dual controls, and it was not shown
that at the time of the accident the defendants were in complete control.
In Michigan Aero Club v. Shelle3y20 although Michigan purports not to
apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in any situation,27 the Court
talks as if the doctrine, although not calling it by name, would have
2153 T. L. R. 254, 255, 81 Sol. J. 80, 81, 1938 U. S. Av. R. 194, 197 (1936).
" HARPER, ToRTs (1938) §77.
23*4 Cal. (2d) 668, 52 P. (2d) 226 (1935). Planes were rented to a movie
company through the defendant. Two planes collided and all were killed. Each
plane had dual controls, and a pilot and director were in each plane. Neither
director could fly, but one director was to signal by wiggling the wings by rocking
the wheel back and forth. The Court said that this might show that the plane
was not under the exclusive control of the pilot.
2A*64 S. D. 243, 266 N. W. 253 (1936). The passengers were prospective
buyers of the plane which had dual controls. Both were flyers and were seated
in a single cockpit with a control stick between them.2 172 S. W. (2d) 806 (Ct. of App., Tenn., 1943).
28283 Mich. 401, 278 N. W. 121 (1938).27 Peplinski v. Kleinke, 299 Mich. 86, 299 N. W. 818 (1941) ; Wabeke v. Bull,
289 Mich. 551, 286 N. W. 825 (1939) ; Loveland v. Nelson, 235 Mich. 623, 209
N. W. 835 (1926) ; Fuller v. Magatti, 231 Mich. 213, 203 N. W. 868 (1925).
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applied had the instrumentality been shown to have been under the
control of the defendant. Massachusetts .held that the doctrine was
inapplicable to a case where a plane crashing into water, ruined the
passenger's clothing. The case turned on the fact that the inspection
of the plane had been done by others than the defendant, and the Court
said, "The principle of res ipsa loquitur only applies where the direct
cause of the accident and so much of the surrounding circumstances as
were essential to its occurrence were within the sole control of the
defendant or their servants. 28
It is to be noted that Canada, in its determination to hold the doc-
trine applicable to unexplained airplane accidents, ignored in the Mc-
Inn erny Case the fact that the dual controls of the plane still being
connected might have enabled one other than the pilot to be in control.
Instead of using this point as prohibiting application of the doctrine,
the Court said that the failure of the pilot to disconnect the dual con-
trols was evidence of his lack of skill and experience.
(2) Direct evidence. The second requirement of res ipsa loquitur
causing difficulty in the airplane cases has been summed up as follows:
"Different jurisdictions are hopelessly in conflict upon the effect of
pleading specific acts of negligence in a case which is properly the sub-
ject of the application of res ipsa loquitur. The better reasoning, how-
ever, seems to favor the view that such allegation of particular negligent
acts does not preclude the plaintiff from relying upon the presumption
created by the doctrine although there are strong decisions by courts
to the contrary.
'29
Canadian 30 and British3' cases have applied res ipsa loquitur al-
though specific allegations of negligence were made. The Canadian
Court stated its position firmly in saying, "Thus if under the law of
evidence, negligence will be inferred in certain circumstances, and if the
plaintiff can prove those circumstances, he need not plead acts of negli-
gence, but may rely on the operation of law to infer negligence ...
And even when he does so plead (as the plaintiffs do in this case) he
does not thereby confine himself to the pleaded particulars, nor lose his




Other courts refuse to apply the doctrine when there is evidence of
negligence. New York courts have held both ways. A New York City
8 Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, 278 Mass. 420, 425, 180 N. E. 212, 214,
1932 U. S. Av. R. 139, 143 (1932).
. HARPER, TORTS (1938) §77; see PROSSER, TORTS (1941) §44.
'oNysted v. Wings Ltd. & Anson v. Same, 3 D. L. R. 336 (K. B., Manitoba,
1942).
" Fosbroke-Hobbes v. Airwork, Ltd., 53 L. T. R. 254, 81 Sol. J. 80, 1938
U. S. Av. R. 194 (1936).
" Nysted v. Wings Ltd. & Anson v. Same, 3 D. L. R. 336, 346 (K. B., Mani-
toba, 1942).
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Municipal Court in the case of Braman-Johnson Service, Inc. v. Thom-
son,33 although the plaintiff alleged specific counts of negligence, applied
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. But in Goodheart v. American Air-
lines, in the Appellate Division, the Court said: "The doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, although it provides for a substitute for direct proof of
negligence where the plaintiff is unable to point out the specific act of
negligence which caused his injury, is a rule of necessity to be in-
voked only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available." 4* IllinoisO and Texas36* refused
to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in cases where specific acts of
negligence were pleaded, and California did likewise in the case involv-
ing an injury suit for the death of the famous explorer Martin
Johnson.
3 7
The Arkansas case of Herndon v. Gregory is peculiar. Although
there is a strong declaration that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was
not applicable to airplane accidents, the Court said: "If the complaint
had alleged some particular act of negligence or some unusual or out of
the ordinary occurrence, from which negligence might be presumed...
then it would have alleged a fact over which human conduct had control
which might have given rise to the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur."38  The dissenting judge took the view that this would
be precisely the case when res ipsa loquitur would not be applied.80*
II. SHOULD THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR APPLY TO ALL
UNEXPLAINED AIRPLANE ACCIDENTS?
The North Carolina Court in refusing to apply the doctrine of res
ipka loquitur in the Whitley Case based its decision on Rochester Gas
and Electric Corp. v. Dunlop, supra. However, that case did not in-
volve injury to a passenger, but property -damage for which the plaintiff
"83 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 602, 1939 U. S. Av. R. 142 (1938).
8*1 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 288, 291 (1937).
" McCusker v. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc., 269 Ill. App. 502, 1933
U. S. Av. P. 105 (1932).
8 *English, v. Miller, 43 S. W. (2d) 643, 644 (Tex. Civ. App., 1931). The
plaintiff's son was killed when the plane crashed while stunt-flying. The Court
said, "The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, under the facts revealed by this record,
would be applicable . . . but for the fact, as contended by the appellant, that the
appellee pleaded specific acts of negligence . . . for which reason the doctrine
cannot be invoked or applied in this case."
' Johnson v. Western Air Express Corp., 45 Cal. App. (2d) 614, 114 P. (2d)(1941).8 190 Ark. 702, 710, 81 S. W. (2d) 849, 852, 1935 U. S. Av. . 38, 45 (1935).
89* See Herndon v. Gregory, 190 Ark. 702, 714, 82 S. W. (2d) 244, 246, 1935
U. S. Av. . 38, 48 (1935) (dissenting opinion) : "The rule of res ipsa loquilur
is applied where no act of negligence is known, in cases where it is simply known
that it would not have happened in the ordinary course of things but for negli-
gence. The majority opinion then calls attention to a number of airplane cases,
but said in each of those cases that the complaint alleged some act of negligence.
I think the majority are mistaken in this."
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was allowed recovery on the theory of trespass. Furthermore, the
Dunlop Case is not the only New York decision on res ipsa loquitur.
New York courts have applied the doctrine in three cases and refused
to apply it in two other cases, not because the doctrine is inapplicable
to unexplained airplane accidents, but because the requirements for a
proper case were not present. The pattern formed by the New York
cases can be traced exactly by looking at all the decisions of the other
courts on this matter.
Recently North Carolina, in the face of many decisions contra,
applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the case of an unexplained
automobile accident. 40 The same statements that have been made re-
futing the applicability of res ipsa loquitur to unexplained airplane
accidents have been made time and again in the past about unexplained
automobile accidents; yet the doctrine, as applied to automobile acci-
dents, has gained widespread use. Both automobiles and airplanes have
gone through the stage of being called dangerous instrumentalities; yet
the automobile in a rapid stage of development has become the most
prevalent mode of transportation, and the airplane is following a sim-
ilar development.
The aviation industry has opposed the application of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur to unexplained airplane accidents because it widens
the scope of liability. However, assuredly it cannot be said that aviation
is not now capable of taking care of its own liabilities. As a recent
author has said, "No one has yet contended that this lusty, new infant
of commerce cannot be self-supporting." 41
To courts which argue that "the time has not yet arrived" for the
application of res ipsa loquitur to unexplained airplane accidents, it can
be replied that the incredible developments in aviation of the past years,
partly brought about by the war, have more clearly established the
-desirability for the treatment of the unexplained airplane accident cases
under the rules of negligence and the accompanying doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.
IDRIENNE E. LEVY.
Joint-Tortfeasors-Effect of Payment by Party Not Liable-
Subrogation
A pedestrian was injured by falling over a stake protruding about
three-eights of an inch from a concrete sidewalk. In a suit against the
City of Charlotte the pedstrain obtained a judgment which the City
paid. In the present action the City seeks to recover from the abut-
"0Etheridge v. Etheridge, 222 N. C. 616, 24 S. E. (2d) 477 (1943), 21 N. C.
L. RFv. 402.
" GEORGE B. LOGAN, AIRcRAFT LAW-MADE PLAIN (1928), p. 52.
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